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NOTES
SALEs-TITLE To GOODS SHIPPED F. 0. B. WITH SIGHT DRAFT
To THE BILL OF LADiNG.-A method of sale which is be-

ATTACHED

coming very common today and which is frequently adopted by manufacturing corporations which distribute goods on an interstate basis is
the f.o.b. shipment in which the seller has the bill of lading made out
to his own order accompanied by a sight draft payable to the seller,
the seller thus being assured of payment and the buyer of delivery. In
cases of this 'general type the seller often sends the order bill of lading,

properly indorsed, to an intermediary bank at the buyer's destination,
accompanied by a draft on the buyer for the price of 'the goods. The

buyer can then, by settling with this bank for the price, receive the bill
of lading, which in turn enables him to get delivery of the goods from
the carrier. But despite the popularity of this type of transaction, there
is a lamentable lack of unanimity among the courts of the various
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states as to whether title passes immediately upon delivery to the carrier, as is the general rule in f.o.b. "point of shipment" contracts, or
whether the title remains in the seller until the draft is paid.
It is well settled in England I that the seller's retention of ownership is merely for the purpose of security, and the beneficial interest as
well as the risk of loss is in the buyer. In this respect the English
point of view is similar to the arrangement for divided property interests involved in conditional sales in which the buyer has the usual benefits and burdens of beneficial ownership, but at the same time the seller
retains a sufficient security interest in the seller to assure him the payment of the purchase price.
2
The English rule is usually regarded, at least by the text writers,
as the better one, and was supported by Justice Cardozo in Standard
Casing Company, Inc. v. California Casing Company, Inc.8 In this
case the plaintiff buyer, the Standard Casing Company, sued the defendant seller, California Casing Company for breach of a contract
made in San Francisco wherein it was agreed that the defendant company would send the plaintiff 20 casks of salted pigs guts. The goods
were to be shipped f. o. b. point of shipment and payment was to be by
sight draft, bill of lading attached with the privilege of examining the
goods on arrival. None of the shipments were made, and the seller's
breach was conceded, and the only question was the extent of the recovery. The plaintiff to prove its damages, gave evidence of the market
value in New York which was to have been the destination of the goods.
The defendant offered evidence, which the lower court would not receive, of the market value in San Francisco, which was the place from
which the goods were to have been shipped. Mr. Justice Cardozo
pointed out that the general rule is that upon a sale "f.o.b. point of
shipment" title passes to the buyer at the moment of delivery to the
carrier. He ruled that the fact that the buyer reserved the right to
inspect the goods upon their arrival, and the fact that payment was to
be made subject to such inspection and on presentation of a draft with
a bill of lading attached, did not evidence any intention not to pass
title to the goods and that the general rile stated above applied in this
case. Cardozo quoted Personal Property Law Section 103 which
states that "where delivery of goods has been made to the buyer, or to
a bailee for the buyer in pursuance of the contract, and the property
in the goods has been retained by the seller merely to secure performance by the buyer of his obligations, the goods are at the buyer's risk
from the time of such delivery." Cardozo held that it was immaterial
whether the bill of lading was made out to the buyer or the seller,
saying that "the risk of transit was the buyer's whether the bill of lad1 Vol. 1 Williston on Sales, Section 280b.
2 Williston on Sales supra note 1; Vold on Sales, page 215.
3 238 N. Y. 413, 135 N. E. 835 (1922).
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ing was made out to him or to the seller. The undertaking here was
merely that the goods be delivered to the carrier. The place where
that was to be done, as it would be the place of final performance by
the seller if the contract had been kept, must also be the place of default when performance was refused. Market values in California, and
not market values in New York, must therefore be the measure of
value of the bargain.
Unfortunately, not only is there much opposition to this view, but
it is actually in the minority as is shown by the fact that Arkansas, 4
Alabama 5 Tennessee,6 Texas, 7 Kentucky s California, 9 Georgia,10 Indiana, 1 Missouri, 12 Michigan,13 Minnesota, 14 Oklahoma, 15 South
Carolina, 16 and Wisconsin, 17 hold that title remains in the seller until
the goods reach their destination and the sight draft is paid when the
goods are shipped f.o.b. with a sight draft attached to the bill of lading.
On the other hand New York,' 8 North Dakota, 19 Connecticut, 20 Illinois,2 1 Massachusetts, 22 Pennsylvania, 23 and Washington, 24 hold
that title passes to the buyer immediately upon delivery to the carrier.
It is noted, perhaps in favor of the latter view, that the states supporting it are more highly commercialized states along the eastern seaboard.
Williston, in his book on sales, 25 suggests that Section 22 of the
Uniform Sales Act should "Remove any doubt that the rule in the
4 Gibson v. Vinton, 21 F (2d) 168 (1927).
5 Browne v. Giger, 221 Ala. 176, 128 So. 174 (1930).
0 Davis v. Sloan Oil Co., 13 Tenn. App. 405 (1931).
7 H. L. Edwards Co. v. Wolf, - Tex., -, 23 S. W. 700 (1930).
8 L. Lazarus Liquor Co. v. Julius Dessler & Co., 269 F. 520 (1920).
9 Puritas Coffee Co. v. DeMartini, 206 F. 96 (1920).
Smith v. Callaway, 29 Ga. App. 565, 116 S.E. 214, (1924).
11 Bruno v. Phillips Co., 80 Ind. App. 658, 142 N. E. 21 (1924).
12 Levine v. Hochman, 217 Mo. App. 76, 273 S.W. 204 (1916).
'3 Star Transfer Line v. General Export Co., 308 Mich. 86, 13 N.
10

217 (1944).
14 Presley Fruit Co. v. St. Louis R. Co.,
(1915.)

130 Minn. 121, 153

W. (2nd)

N. W. 115

15 St. Louis Carbonating Co. v. Lookeba St. Bank, 35 Oki. 434, 130 P. 280
(1913).
16 State v. Malony, 59 S. C. 402, 62 S.E. 215 (1908).
17 Libman v. Fox PioneerScrap Iron Co., 175 Wis. 485, 185 N. W. 551 (1921).
18 Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Bank of U. S.214 App. Div. 410, 212 N. Y. S.
437 (1926).
19 Braufman v. Bender, 58 N. D. 165, 225 N. W. 69 (1929).
20 Alderman Bros. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 92 Conn. 419, 103 A. 267
(1918).
21 Maffei . Sinocchio, 299 Ill. 254, 132 N. E. 518 (1921).
22 Peoples National Bank of Boston v. Mulkolland, 224 Mass. 448, 113 N. E.
365 (1916).
23 New York & Pennsylvania Co. v. Cunard Coal Co., 286 Pa. 72, 132 A
828 (1926).
24 Norbon Engineering Co. v. A. H. Cox & Co., 120 Wash. 675, 208 P. 87
(1922).
25 Williston on Sales, supra note 1.
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United States is the same as the rule in England." The Section provides that "Where delivery of the goods has been made to the buyer,
or to a bailee for the buyer in pursuance of the contract and the property in the goods has been retained by the seller merely to secure performance by the buyer of his obligation under the contract, the goods
are at the buyer's risk from the time of such delivery." Section 20
(2) of the Act also seems applicable to the situation in providing that
"If, except for the form of the bill of lading the property would have
passed to the buyer on shipment of the goods, the seller's property in
the goods shall be deemed to be only for the purpose of securing performance by the buyer of his obligation under the contract."
Although these provisions of the Uniform Sales Act should "remove
any doubt" as is stated by Mr. Williston, it is apparent that they have
not done so. An Alabama court - ruled that where a draft drawn
on the buyer for the price and with the bill of lading attached was
forwarded, though the bill ivas in the buyer's name, title to the goods
did not pass until the draft was honored and the bill delivered. It was
held in Wisconsin 27 that by attaching the bill of lading to a sight
draft indorsed to a bank, title to the goods passed to the bank and
could not vest in the purchaser until the draft was paid. In Minnesota 28
it was said: "The contract specifically provides that the company will
ship vehicles to him, with sight draft against bill of lading attached,
to be paid with exchange upon presentation. Under such circumstances
it is clear that the intention was that the consignor retain title to the
property until the same was in some way settled for by the consignee."
Where goods were consigned to the seller, the bill of lading issued to
the order of the seller, and the bill of lading with a draft attached
was assigned to a bank for collection, title was held 29 to remain in the
seller until the draft was paid. Under a contract providing for payment on presentation of invoices and bills of lading at a named bank
at the buyer's residence, a Maryland court 80 held that the title remained in the seller until the invoices and bills of lading were presented.
On the other hand, cases supporting the view that although the
power of disposal of the goods, sometimes called "title retained only
for security," is retained in the seller as a form of security for the price,
nevertheless the beneficial interest passes to the buyer on shipment in
accordance with the ordinary rules of appropriation. Title to goods
sold f.o.b. point of delivery, payment to be made by draft bill of lading
attached was held 31 to pass to the vendee on delivery to the carrier,
Browne v. Giger, supra note 5.
Libman v. Fox Pioneer Scrap Iron Co., supra note 17.
Mansen v. Shepherd, 154 Minn. 227, 191 N. W. 599 (1923).
29 Pottastz v. Cleveland-Akron Bag Co., 235 N. Y. 520, 139 N. E. 717 (1923).
30 Edgar v. Imperial Ice Cream Co., 139 Md. 630, 116 A. 461 (1922).
S1 Penna. R. R. v. Bank of U. S., supra note 18.
26
27
28
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subject only to a right in the vendor to withhold delivery until payment in view of Section 20 of the Uniform Sales Act. In another
New York case 3 2 title was held to have passed to the buyer on
delivery to the carrier under a contract for the purchase of the goods
f.o.b. at a certain place to be paid for on the delivery of shipping documents. An Illinois 83 court stated, "The rule is that, subject to the
intention of the parties, the property in the goods shipped under an
f. o. b. contract passes to the buyer at the moment of delivery to the
carrier, and the fact that the bill of lading is made out to the seller does
not indicate an inconsistent intention."
For reasons of convenience and the security which this method of
doing business provides for both buyer and. seller, the practice of shipping goods f.o.b. with sight draft attached to the bill ot lading will undoubtedly continue to be utilized by business men and organizations
in the United States. However, due to the great uncertainty as to
whether the title is in the buyer or the seller, the parties might do well
to express their intention as to this point in writing in the contract of
sale.
John M. Anderton
JOINT TENANciS--CoNvEYANcE

By

ONE

To HIMSELF

AND

AN-

oTMR.-The joint tenancy in real estate has long been in disfavor in
the law. 1 At least one state has abolished it altogether, as it was
known at common law. 2 A great majority of the states have passed
statutes which, although still recognizing the tenancy, provide that the
courts shall construe a deed to two or more grantees to create a tenancy
in common, and not a joint tenancy, unless the intent to create the
latter estate shall clearly be manifested upon the face of the instrument.3 It is paradoxical, therefore, that there should be discernible lately a trend to liberalize the rules for the creation of the joint tenancy.
Yet, such a trend exists, and it is pointed up by a recent enactment of
the Wisconsin legislature. 4
In May, 1947, § 230.45(3) was repealed and re-enacted to read: 5
Any deed to two or more grantees, including any deed in
which the grantor is also one of the grantees, which by the
82 Disch v. National Surety Co., 203 App. Div. 723, 196 N. Y. S. 833 (1922).
33 Alberti v. Associated Fruit Co. 238 IM. App. 11, 163 N. E. 198 (1925).
1

2 TtoMPsoN REAL PROPERTY (3d. ed. 1939) §420.

2

GEoRrA CODE (1933)

§ 85-1002.

3 ILL. STAT. ANN. (Jones, 1935) § 70.01; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1943 Rep.)
§ 56.111; MImi. STAT. ANN. (1936)

§ 26.44; Wis. STAT. (1945)

amples chosen at random.
4 Chap. 140, Laws of 1947, approved May 19, 1947.
5 Ibid.

§ 230.45(1) are ex-
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method of describing such grantees or by the language of the
granting or habendum clause therein evinces an intent to create
a joint tenancy in grantees shall be held and construed to
create such joint tenancy.
The import of the statute is obvious. It permits a person to deed
his interest to himself and another in joint tenancy. This result, here
achieved by statute, is in line with the liberal rule of some other jurisdictions which either by express statute or by broad court constructions
obviate the necessity of a strawman deed.
Long before this particular statute was enacted, Wisconsin had a
liberal statute governing the creation of a joint tenancy between husband and wife. Any deed from husband to wife, or vice versa, which
conveyed an interest in the grantor's lands and evinced an intent to
create a joint tenancy between grantor and grantee, was to be construed to create that joint tenancy. 6 No strawman deed was necessary
here.
Nonetheless a grave doubt existed as to the grantor's ability to deed
"straight across" into a joint tenancy where the parties were not husband and wife. § 230.45(3) (before re-enactment) provided, "Any
deed to two or more grantees which by the method of describing such
grantees ... shall be held and construed to create (a) joint tenancy." 7
In the face of that section, the court in Hass v. Hass8 held that a deed
which purported to convey a joint tenancy in both realty and personalty between a mother (grantor) and son, containing a granting clause
granting a life estate as joint tenants during their joint lives and an
absolute fee to the survivor, was not effective to create a joint tenancy. Rather it held that the deed created a tenancy in common for
the joint lives of the parties with the survivor to take the remainder.
Such a decision presented many problems of rights under the tenancy, 9
not discussed by the court. A rehearing was immediately requested, on
the grounds that the decision had thrown the law of the tenancy into
dismal confusion. The court thereupon explained that the son, provided
he outlive his mother, would take the fee by virtue of an indestructible
remainder, not by survivorship. 10
Perhaps this is not what the legislature had in mind when the
statute was enacted, or perhaps it was felt that a revision was necessary
to put an end to all indecision; at any rate, the phrase, "including any
deed in which the grantor is also one of the grantees" was added. There
have been as yet no cases decided under the new enactment, but to
permit a deed "straight across" is the only possible result, in view of
6 Wis.

STAT. (1945)

§ 230.45(2).

7 Wis. STAT. (1945) 230.45(3).
8 248 Wis. 212, 21 N. W. (2d) 398 (1946).

9 See case noted, (1946) Vol. 1 Wis. Law Rev. 117.
10 On rehearing, 248 Wis. 212, 22 N. W. (2d) 151 (1946).
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the history of the legislation. To the layman, this is nothing startling.
"Well, why not?", he asks. Many lawyers, who appreciate the "why
not," say, "It's about time."
For a grantor to deed an interest to himself was impossible at common law. First, delivery is essential to the operation of a deed," and
one cannot effect a delivery to himself. Secondly, essential to a joint
tenancy is the concurrence of the unities of time, title, interest and possession. 12 In a deed from one to himself and another, the unities of
time and title would be missing.' 3 Thirdly, one cannot give himself that
which he already has. 14 These are given as reasons when courts,
struggling with the technicalities of the common law, have arrived at
greatly varied and irreconcilable conclusions. In construing deeds purporting to convey one's interest to himself and another, the courts have
reached four separate results:1 5
1) There are cases holding that the entire fee vests in the grantee(s)
not the grantor.' 8 The theory is that one cannot give himself that
which he already has, but that since the intent of the parties should
be given effect where possible, the fee will vest in any named grantee
capable of taking.
2) A large group of cases are to the effect that such a deed will create a tenancy in common in the grantees.' 7 Although the unities of
time and title are missing, the deed is capable of passing an undivided
interest and creating such an estate.
3) In states where tenancies by the entirety exist, such a deed is
capable of creating that tenancy, if the parties are husband and wife.' 8
Married Women's Statutes enabling spouses to contract freely with one
another permit such a result, if that would be the result of a conveyance to them jointly by a stranger.
11 4 THO PsoN REAL PROPERTY (3d. ed. 1939) § 1033.
12 2 BL. ComM. 179-182; vol. 4 Am. Jur., Cotenancy, § 7.
18 See: Union Guardian Trust Co. v. Vogt, 263 Mich. 330, 248 N. W. 639

(1933).
See: Hicks v. Sprankle, 149 Tenn. 310, 257 S. W. 1044 (1924).
15 See, generally: Notes (1929) 62 A. L. R. 514; (1942) 137 A. L. R. 348;
(1947) 166 A. L. R. 1026.
16 A good case to this result is Hicks v. Sprankle, 149 Tenn. 310, 257 S. W.
1044 (1924).
17 Green v. Cannady, 77 S. C. 193, 57 S. E. 832 (1907); Price v. Nat. Union
14

Fire Ins. Co., 294 Mich. 289, 293 N. W. 652 (1940); Deslauriersv. Senesac, 331 111.
437, 163 N. E. 327 (1928); and See: Fay v. Smiley, 201 Iowa 1290, 207 N. W. 369
(1926).
18 In Re Kiatzl's Estate 216 N. Y. 83, 110 N. E. 181 (1915) ; In Re Vogelsang's
Estate 122 Misc. 599, 203 N.Y.S. 364 (1924); Johnson v. Landefield, 138 Fla. 511,

189 So. 666 (1939); Cadgene v. Cadgene, 124 N. J. L. 566, 12 A. (2d) 635 (1940);
Re Vandergrift, 105 Pa. Super. Ct. 293, 161 Atl. 898 (1932).
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4) Lastly, a few jurisdictions permit the creation, in this manner,
of a joint tenancy. In almost every instance, the parties involved in
these cases were husband and wife.19
In every instance of this last-mentioned category, the result has
been based upon the construction of some statute. Nebraska has
achieved it by uncompromising statutory phraseology: 20
Any person or persons owning property which he or they
have power to convey, may effectively convey such property
by a conveyance naming himself or themselves and another
person or persons, as grantees, and the conveyance has the
same effect as to whether it creates a joint tenancy, or tenancy
in common, or tenancy inpartnership, as if it were a conveyance from a stranger who owned the property to the persons
named in the conveyance.., any "person" mentioned in this
section may be married, and any "persons" so mentioned may
be married to each other.
Iowa, 21 New York,2 2 Rhode Island, 23 and New Hampshire 24 achieve
the same result by construction of statutes not so unequivocal, but
sufficiently broad to justify the decisions. A federal court 2 5 has decided that a strawman deed is unnecessary in California. Massachusetts has taken the view that one could not create a tenancy by the entireties in such manner, but that such a deed purporting to do so would
create a joint tenancy. 26

Whether the result is rationalized upon the

theory that the grantor reserves an interest, 27 or upon the theory that
the unities requirement is outmoded and absurd,2 8 the courts are certain
that directness and simplicity in conveyancing are not evil per se.
Such courts and legislatures have fulfilled a long felt need. The
view of the layman, annoyed by the irksome formalities encumbering
the transfer of his real estate, is shared by the lawyer who must defer
to the often absurd technicalities. "The necessity of requiring an extra
deed makes a fetish out of form and compels the parties to the instrument to employ an indirect maneuver of the 18th Century merely to
satisfy the outmoded unities rule." 29
19, See cases cited infra, notes 21-24.
20 R v. STAT. of NEB. (1943) § 76-118(1).
21 Switzer v. Pratt, Iowa -, 23 N. W. (2d) 837 (1946).
22 Saron v. SaXon, 46 Misc. 202, 93 N.Y.S. 191 (1905).
28 Lawton v. Lawton, 48 R. I. 134, 136 Ad. 241 (1927).
24 Therrien v. Therrien, -N.
H.-, 46 A. (2d) 538 (1946).
25

Edmonds v. Comm. of Int. Rev., 90 F. (2d) 14 (C.C.A. 9th, 1937), cer.

tiorari denied, 302 U. S. 713, 82 L. Ed. 551, 58 S. Ct. 32 (1937).
26 Ames v. Chandler, 265 Mass. 428, 164 N. E. 616 (1929).
27 See: Dutton v. Buckley, 116 Ore. 661, 242 Pac. 626 (1926.)
28 See: Therrien v. Therrien, -N.
H.-, 46 A. (2d) 538 (1946).
29 Therrien v. Therrien, -N.
H.-, 46 A. (2d) 538 (1946).
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One of the courts adopting this liberal rule has been of the opinion
that it represents the weight of authority.80 A review of the cases
makes this statement doubtful. But perhaps the strength of these authorities will prompt other jurisdictions to institute a modernization of
the whole law of conveyancing. To do so would be to perform a service to layman and lawyer alike.
B. M. Apker

CIVIL RiiGTS-THE TREND IN STATE FAIR ENPLOYMENT PRACTICE
LEGISLATION.-A last minute 1 check conducted in forty-eight states by
the Notre Dame Lawyer shows that legislation providing against discrimination in employment on racial or religious grounds has been enacted in seven states 2 and was proposed during 1947 in seventeen additional states. The attempt to secure laws forbidding this type of discrimination has been made at three levels: in the Congress to re-create
the war-time Fair Employment Practice Committee8 with some extension of the powers which that committee exercised during the war;
in the state legislatures, to create similar committees with statewide
powers; and in municipal assemblies for city anti-discrimination ordinances. These endeavors seem most likely to meet with success at the
second, or state, level.
The acts and bills may be classified into three groups: first, those
whose legal effect is little more than a resolution, or a more particularized restatement of the state bill of rights; secondly, those setting up
committees to explore the need for further legislation, and to make
recommendations; thirdly, those which define certain discriminatory
practices, provide a commission for hearing of complaints and issuing
cease and desist orders, and which contain a penalty clause.
The first type is exemplified in the very recent Oregon Fair Employmeat Practice Act, which declares it the "... . public policy of this
state to encourage the employment of all persons in accordance with
their fullest capacities, regardless of their race, color, religion, sex, union
membership, national origin or ancestry.. ." The act goes on alterna80 Edmonds v. Comm. of Int. Rev., 90 F. (2d) 14, 16, (C.C.A. 9th, 1937).
Completed October 15, 1947.
New York: N. Y. Laws, c. 118; New Jersey: N. J. Laws 1945, c. 169; 18
N. J. STAT. AwN. (West, Supp. 1946) 25-1; Indiana: Ind. Laws 1945, c. 325; IND.
STAT. ANN. (Burns, Supp. 1945) 40-2301; Wisconsin: Wis. Laws 1945, c. 490;
Massachusetts: Mass. Laws 1946, c. 368; Connecticut: Public Act. No. 171; Oregon: see Enrolled House Bill No. 385, enacted in 1947.
8 Created by President Roosevelt in 1941 through executive orders No. 8802
and 9346. The famed FEPC was allowed to die an unnatural death through failure of appropriation to sustain it. A new federal FEPC has been proposed in the
Senate (S.984) and by several House bills.
1
2
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tively to declare state policy to be against racial or religious discrimination on the part of any agency of the state. It concludes by authorizing the state department of education to ". . . prepare such educational
program as is deemed necessary, calculated to discourage prejudice
against minority groups, and point out its incompatibility with American principles of equality and fair play." This act, it will be noted,
merely authorizes the preparation of "educational programs as is deemed
necessary," without more. No administrative machinery for the educational program is provided for; no allocation of funds to support such
a program is mentioned. Although the purpose of the act is stated to
be "To discourage discriminatory employment practices," it was apparently the mind of the Oregon legislature that this declaration of policyfor that is all the act really amounts to-would be sufficient to accomplish that purpose. Critics of FEPC legislation will no doubt take heart
in the passage of Oregon-type acts, which nominally respond to the cry
for anti-discrimination laws, but in fact are acts which do not act.
Proponents of FEPC legislation may take comfort at least in the fact
that the Oregon-type law lays a valuable precedent for further, more
definite laws, in that it declares discrimination in employment to be
against public policy.
Examples of the second type of legislation are found in the Indiana
and Wisconsin statutes. The Indiana act has reference to racial and
religious discrimination on the part both of employers and labor unions.
The Wisconsin act, in its "definitions" clause, "also includes discrimination ...in the fields of housing, recreation, education, health and
social welfare." The Indiana law confers upon the commissioner of
labor the functions of appointing such employees as are necessary for
carrying out of a program of "comprehensive studies" of discrimination in employment, "formulating ...plans" for its elimination, "receiving and investigating" complaints, and "making specific and detailed recommendations to the interested parties ...as to ways and
means for the elimination of any such discrimination." The commissioner may, under the act, recommend a specific plan to the general
assembly after study and investigation. The act provides for salaries
and expenses of the employees appointed by the commissioner (not to
exceed in total $15,000 annually).
The Indiana act, it will be observed, considers the discrimination
problem worthy of study, but indefinitely postpones a solution. The
wonder of the statute consists in this: the act and its passage admit
a discrimination problem serious enough in scope to warrant legislative
action; but the legislative action expressed in the act only leads up to
ascertaining the scope of the problem. It may be argued that comprehensive study ought to precede comprehensive action, but the Indiana
statute has now been in effect since March of 1945, and the stage of
"studies," "formulating," "investigating," and "making recommenda-
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tions" still obtains, with neither effective legislative fruits of such a
stage insight, nor, on the other hand, the prospect of a forthright abolishment of the existing agency with its attendant expense to the public.
Of the third type of proposed or existing statutes are the New York,
New Jersey, Massachusetts, and (very recent) Connecticut acts. They
differ somewhat in their scope of operations. The act in each of these
states sets up a Fair Employment Practice Commission. In general,
the commission has the power and duty 4 (1) to investigate complaints
alleging discrimination in employment because of "race, color, religious
creed, national origin, or ancestry," (2) to hold hearings, subpoena
witnesses thereto, and take testimony relating to matter under investigation, (3) to create "conciliation councils" on a statewide basis
to study the discrimination problem and to make recommendations to
the commissioner for development of policies. The act defines certain
unlawful employment practices. These include the refusal of an employer "to hire or employ or to bar or discharge from employment" a
person on account of race or creed, or to "discharge from employment
such individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms," unless based upon a "bona fide occupational qualification" (the last-quoted term undefined in the statute). A procedure
for complaint is set forth. Where a commissioner determines probable
cause to exist, he takes the first remedial step of "conference, conciliation and persuasion." Where this step fails, the commissioner issues
written notice to the party complained against, requiring the latter to
appear at a hearing before the commission in order to answer charges.
Should the commission now determine that the respondent has engaged
in unlawful employment practices specified in the act, a third step is
taken: an order to cease and desist from the practice. Judicial review
is provided for. Punishment by fine or imprisonment, or both, is specified for wilful violation of a final order of the commission, or the filing
of a false complaint.
Turning to the bills introduced in state legislatures in 1947, by far
the greater number of these, it would seem, follow the model of the
New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts laws. Only in one state,
Connecticut, did such a bill succeed in passing. A Missouri FEPC bill
was recommended "Do not pass" by the Labor Committee; a strong
FEPC bill in Pennsylvania was not reported out of committee. So in
Rhode Island (senate FEPC bill failed of passage), Minnesota (bill
passed senate but was defeated in house), Washington (FEPC bills
either defeated or never got out of committee), West Virginia (bill
killed in committee), Ohio (several bills, none of which passed), California (FEPC bill never came to a vote), Utah (FEPC bill failed of
passage). In Michigan, Delaware, Colorado, Iowa, Illinois, and Ne4 The Massachusetts act is here described. Its main features are identical with
those of the other three FEPC states.
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braska, bills proposing some sort of anti-discrimination legislation in
employment failed to become law. In Indiana and Wisconsin measures
purporting to "put teeth" in the present laws of these two states likewise failed to pass.
The trend in proposed legislation is plainly in the direction of the
New York FEPC type law. There is, apparently, however, a consistent
determination in the present state assemblies to defeat such strong antidiscrimination measures. In at least one state having an FEPC law,
the attempt has been made to repeal it. 5 Extension of the scope of operation of existing laws has been urged in the seven states having antidiscrimination laws. In half of the states, however, no such laws have
been proposed. 6
William B. Ball

CO-OPERATIEs-A PRIVILEGED RESTRAINT OF TRADE.-Both reason

and history convince us that it is wise to keep the bridge short between
the producer and the consumer. Logically a saving of time and money
is made if the "middleman," in so far as is conveniently possible, is removed from the chain of the satisfaction of human wants. The past
and present can be called upon to relate the incongruous situation, present in times of economic depression, of stockpiles of rotting food and
manufactured products casting shadows over the hungry and destitute.
An early English statute prohibited forestalling, engrossing and regrating measures undertaken by tradesmen to place themselves between
the producer and the consumer for purposes of profit. These three
typical early English statutory terms defined methods by which a
person bought from the producer at one price and sold to the consumer
at, naturally, a higher price.' This middleman activity was legislatively
5 Massachusetts.
6 Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, New Hampshire, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Wyoming.
1 Statutes at Large, 7 Edw. VI Vol. 5, ch. 14.
Forestalling consisted of buying victuals on their way to market and before
they reached it, with the intent to sell again at a higher price.
Engrossing was the buying at any place of certain necessities of life from producers with a view to resale at a higher price.
Regrating was the purchase of provisions at a fair or public market for the
purpose of resale at a higher price in the same market or in any market within
four miles thereof.
The statutes which designated the indicated practices illegal were repealed by
12 George III, chap. 71,

(1772)

7,8 Victoria, chap. 24 (1884).

It

was decided

by the English legislative body that the prohibited acts had come to be considered
as favorable to the development of, and not in restraint of, trade.

NOTES
determined to be repugnant to the best interests of society in that it obstructed the free flow of want-satisfying goods. American common law
inherited this principle of public policy-the principle and tradition
against restraints of trade.
With the increasing complexity of communal life, intermediaries in
the form of wholesalers, jobbers and retailers proved themselves to be
convenient, but only as they aided and not hindered the free flow
of goods. Thus we see the common law demanding that the bridge
between the producer and the consumer be kept as short as possible
for the protection of the public.
In a discussion of the co-operative as a legally privileged body, it
would be well to keep in mind that the early common law tradition opposing restraints of trade was based on a sound principle of public
policy, namely, the consumer should pay only a just and reasonable
price for the goods and at the same time guaranteeing to the producer a
reasonable return for his expended effort. Measures devised by men in
the business world which either forced the consumer to pay an exorbitant
price or withheld from the producer a reasonable remuneration were,
and are, said to be contrary to public policy. Generally an unfair price
adjustment was brought about by a stifling of competition preventing
the buyer from purchasing at a reasonable price or prohibiting the
seller from marketing at a reasonable profit. Such a stifling of competition, when it did tend to bring about unfair price adjustment, was
considered an unreasonable restraint of 1rade. English and American
common law considered these unreasonable restraints of trade as un2
lawful.
2 "It is certain that at a very remote period the words 'contract in restraint
of trade' in England came to refer to some voluntary restraint put by contract
by an individual on his right to carry on his trade or calling. Originally all such
contracts were considered to be illegal, because it was deemed they were injurious
to the public as well as to the individuals who made them. In the interest of the
freedom of individuals to contract, this doctrine was modified so that it was only
when a restraint by contract was so general as to be coterminous with the kingdom
that it was treated as void. That is to say, if the restraint was partial in its operation, and was otherwise reasonable tije contract was held to be valid." This
passage is from Mr. Chief justice White's opinion in the Standard Oil Co. v.
United States 221 U. S. 141, 55 L. Ed. 619, 31 S. Ct. 502 (1910).
"Applying the rule of reason to the construction of the statute (Sherman AntiTrust Act) it was held in the Standard Oil case that, as the words 'restraint of
trade' at common law and in the law of this country at the time of the adoption
of the anti-trust act only embraced acts or contracts or agreements or combinations which operated to the prejudice of the public interests by unduly restricting
competition . . . if possible serves to strengthen our conviction as to the correctness of the rule of 'construction-the rule of reason-which was applied in the
Standard Oil case the application of which rule to the statute we, now, in the
most unequivocal terms, re-express and re-affirm." United States v. American
Tobacco Co. 221 U. S. 106, 179, 55 L. Ed. 663, 694, 31 S. Ct. 632 (1910).
Also see American Jurisprudence "Monopolies" Sec. 8 and the voluminous list
of cases and annotations appended thereto.
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Even with this generally accepted interpretation of the common law,
courts reflected anything but a consistent view when the question of
the legality of a co-operative association contract was presented to them.
Some courts, ostensibly relying on the common law, ruled that the cooperative agreement was an unreasonable restraint of trade. These
courts took the view that it was unreasonable to prohibit a wholesaler
from dealing with a co-operative member who, were he to obey the
contract, could sell only to the co-operative itself. Following this same
reasoning, the courts deemed it unreasonable to hold a member to a
contract which permitted him to sell only to the co-operative. It was
reasoned that economic success in a free enterprise system depends on
a competitive market. Those contracts which tended to stifle competition were held to be unreasonable restraints of trade.3 Other jurisdictions faced with the same or comparable facts, and employing the same
common law interpretation of fair trade practices, stamped co-operative
activities as reasonable and beneficial methods of trade. These courts
decided that an agreement to raise the remuneration to the producer and
yet maintain a fair price to the consumer was definitely beneficial to
the public. It was a worthy and wholesome endeavor, said these courts,
to guarantee both a reasonable price to the consumer and a fair return
4
to the producer.
3 Reeves v. Decorah Farmers Co-operative Society, 160 Iowa 194, 140 N. W.
844, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1104 (1913), decided that a co-operative contract of exclusive sale by the member producer to the co-operative was illegal. The Supreme
Court of Iowa held that such a contract stifled competition and was, therefore,
an unreasonable restraint of trade. The plaintiff, a buyer of hogs for a Chicago
wholesaler, was prevented from buying from the farmer members of the co-operative and thus, the court felt, he was a victum of unreasonable measures of business activity.
In Ludowese v. Farmers' Mut. Co-op. Co., 164 Iowa 197, 145 N. W. 475 (1914),
the Reeves Case, supra, was specifically followed but in this case, it was the producer member of the co-operative, the court held, who was unjustly treated. The
member had sold to another when his contract of membership stipulated exclusive
sale to the co-operative. This type of contract, which prevented the producer
from freely choosing his buyer stifled competition and was an unreasonable restraint of trade, the court said.
In accord are: Burns v. Wray Farmers' Grairt Co., 65 Col. 425, 176 P. 487
(1918); Atkinson v. Colorado Wheat Growers' Ass'n., 77 Col. 559, 238 P. 1117
(1925); Georgia Fruit Exchange v. Turnipseed, 9 Ala. App. 123, 62 So. 542 (1913);
Ford v. Chicago Milk Shippers Ass'n., 155 Ill. 166, 39 N. E. 651, 27 L. R. A, 298

(1895).
However as the public policy of the country changed, all the jurisdictions
which refused to accept the co-operative method of doing -business, at first, later
manifested a different view, reversing their previous holdings. Rifle Potato Grower's
Co-op. Ass'n. v. Dexter Smith, 78 Col. 171, 240 P. 937 (1925); Ex parte Baldwin
County Producers Corporation, 203 Ala. 345, 83 So. 69 (1919); Milk Producers'
Marketing Co. v. Bell, 234, Ill. App. 222 (1924).
4 "In this case, we think it may be admitted that the contract in suit was
executed in furtherance of a combination in restraint of trade by the growers of
Burley tobacco, the market for which was controlled by a trust. But the purpose
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The inconsistent holdings of courts in various jurisdictions regarding the legality of co-operative exclusive marketing contracts testified
to the fact that courts were not, as yet, convinced that co-operative
activity was in the public interest. Thd courts were still pondering the
implications of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Some, only too recently
faced with the odious results of business when it becomes "big," were
prone to decree any and all combinations unlawful restraints of trade.
There is no question that the Sherman Act and state anti-trust
measures were aimed at the great evil of the day, industrial giants
who displayd an utter disregard for the general welfare in their ruthless, rampant race for economic profit and power. 5 Legislators, apparently, little considered the effect their laws would have on agriculture.
But since agriculture was not specifically excluded from the acts,
courts which preferred a literal translation saw no reason to free farmof the combination does not appear to be other than to secure a fair and adequate
price for their product. We think such acts could not be held to be in conflict
with the morals of the time or to contravene any established interest of society.
Public policy does not ask those who till the soil to take less than a fair return
for their labor. Public policy safeguards society from oppression; it is not an
instrument of oppression." Burley Tobacco Society v. Gillaspy, 51 Ind. App. 583,
100 N. E. 89 (1912). In this case a co-operative member was being sued for
liquidated damages by reason of his selling tobacco to other than the co-operative
with whom he had contracted. The court upheld the right of the co-operative to
recover as per contract stipulations, thus announcing the validity of the co-operative contract.
In accord are Milk Producers' Marketing Co. v. Bell, 234 Ill. App. 222 (1924);
Bullville Milk Producers' Ass'n. v. Armstrong, 178 N. Y. S. 612 (1919); Castorland Milk and Cheese Co. v. Shantz, 179 N. Y. S. 131 (1919); Ex parte Baldwin
County Producers' Corporation, 203 Ala. 345, 83 So. 69 (1919).
5 "The evils of the 'trusts,' as the public without much discrimination described all big businesses, became increasingly apparent. Prices were fixed without the benefit of competition, and sometimes at higher levels than before the
trust was formed. Raw producers were compelled to take what the trust chose to
pay, for there was no one else to whom to sell. Labor was forced into line by
the closing of troublesome plants, and by the circulation of 'blacklists' that made
it difficult for agitators to obtain employment. Politicians were influenced by
free passes from the railroads, by campaign contributions, and by outright bribes.
* * * Powerful lobbies appeared in Washington and in the several state capitals
charged with the duty of winning favors from lawmakers and law-enforcers. The
Washington lobbyists were sometimes described as the 'third house' of Congress.
Plants that experience had shown to be well located were enlarged, and others
less ideally situated were closed down, without regard to the inevitable unemployment involved or the municipal problems that arose from the concentration of
vast numbers of people at whatever centers business leaders deemed strategic. Individual freedom suffered blow after blow as the owners of small establishments
became the employees of larger ones and as the chance to enter business independently grew less and less. Employees were pushed farther and farther from the
sight and hearing of employers, and fewer occasions existed for emotions of the
'heart' to influence the conduct of businessmen who prided themselves upon their
'hard-headedness'." These are the conditions which existed in the United States
says Hicks in The American Nation (1946) previous to the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
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ers from the effects of anti-trust legislation. Obviously these jurisdictions saw no reason to differentiate agriculture from industry in the
formation of their views of public policy. In fact the United States
Supreme Court in 1902 emphatically denied to agriculture the privilege
of exemption as a class from the legislation. 6 These circumstances may
explain, in part, the original reluctance by some courts to legally bless
the co-operative movement.
The co-operative movement, although not peculiar to agriculture,
rose to prominence in the United States by its use in rural areas. In the
marketing of their crops, farmers were searching for relief from their
position of bargaining slaves, a status to which the organized buyer had
reduced them by his business tactics. Some farmers, then, turned to
the power of unity offered by the co-operative as an avenue of escape
7
from their unfavorable bargaining predicament.
As the plight of the farmer grew worse, public sympathy for the agricultural element increased. Likewise it became apparent to the economists of the day that a healthy country demanded a vigorous, substantial farm body. It was obvious that there was a wide divergence between
the interests of industry as far as legislation was concerned. More
jurists were convinced that agriculture as a class could be, at times,
excluded from legislative action if it were necessary for the public
good. Recognition of the farmers' dilemma resulted in positive legislative action for his benefit. An amendment was enacted to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act specifically exempting the farmer from some of its
effects.8 Other legislation also gave the farmer the privilege of com10 Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. Ed. 679, 22
431

(1902)

S. Ct.
held that agriculture as a class could not be exempt from legislative

acts. Connolly purchased sewer pipe from the defendant and refused to pay for
it, claiming that he was not liable for the goods purchased from the trust as
stipulated in the Illinois Anti-Trust Act. Connolly contended that the Sewer Pipe
Co. was a trust. The Pipe Co. countered by maintaining that the anti-trust
statute was void because it exempted agriculture as a class from its provisions.
The Supreme Court of the United States upheld this contention.
The Connolly Case was specifically overruled in Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141.
84 L. Ed. 1124, 60 S. Ct. 879 (1940).
7 A co-operative is a business organization, usually incorporated, owned and
controlled by member producers and consumers, which operates for the mutual
benefit of its members or stockholders, as producers and patrons, on a cost basis
after allowing for expenses of operation and maintenance and any other authorized deductions for expansion and necessry reserves. Hulbert, Legal Phases of
Co-operative Associations (May 1942).
In essence a co-operative association is an entity through which producers sell
and consumers buy.
8 Clayton Act 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. Sec. 12-27 (1934).
Section six of the Clayton Act reads, in part: "Nothing contained in the antitrust acts shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purpose of mutual help,
and not having capital stock, or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain Individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate
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bining for the purpose of guaranteeing a reas 6nable return for his labor. 9 The courts, then, took judicial notice of the fact that agriculture
as a class could be legally differentiated from other groups.
In upholding the validity of-an exclusive marketing contract between
a member and the co-operative, one court said:
We take judicial knowledge of the history of the country
and of current events and from that source we know that
conditions at the time of the Bingham Act (Co-operative Incorporating Statute) were such that the agricultural producer
was at the mercy of speculators and others who fixed the price
of the selling producer and the purchasing price of the final
consumer through combinations and other arrangements,
whether valid or invalid, and that by reason thereof the former
obtained a grossly inadequate price for his products. So much
so was that the case that the intermediate handler between the
producer and the final consumer injuriously operated upon
both classes and fattened and flourished at their expense. It
was and is a well known fact that without the agricultural producer society could not exist, and the oppression brought about
in the manner indicated was driving him from his farm, thereby creating a condition fully justifying an exception in his
case from any provision of the common law, and likewise
justifying legislative action in the exercise of its police power.
(Italics ours).10

It was apparent that a change had taken place in the public policy
of the United States. The freedom of contract dogma which industrialists and middlemen had argued to the courts in an effort to stem
the early advance of co-operatives into the business world became
tempered with the interest of the country as a whole. The right to
freedom of contract can never be upheld if an individual or a group is
unreasonably injured thereby. It was felt that the best interest of
the public would be served if co-operative agreements were formed, proobjects thereof: nor shall such organizations, or members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the
anti-trust laws."
9 Capper-Volstead Act, 42 Stat. 388 (1922) 7 U. S. C. Sec. 291-292 (1934),
expressly authorized marketing combinations for the mutual benefit of members
as producers if (1) no member is allowed more than one vote because of his
stock or membership capital or the association does not pay dividends on capital
in excess of eight per cent, and (2) the association does not deal in the products of
non-members in an amount greater in value than those of members.
The Act also provides for a procedure to prevent marketing associations from
restraining trade to such an extent that prices are unduly enhanced.
10 Liberty Warehouse Company v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Co-operative
Marketing Association, 208 Ky. 649, 271 S. W. 695 (1925). Quoted by United
States in 276 U. S.71, 72 L. Ed. 473, 48 S.Ct. 291 (1928), and substantiated by a
long list of cases cited therein.
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tected, and carried out. This necessarily deprived certain middlemen
of their past freedom in choosing their producer and vested this right
largely in the co-operative. The courts admitted that these results were
inevitable, if a change from the past inefficient and wasteful method of
marketing was to be replaced by a more efficient and equitable procedure of bringing producer goods to the consumer."
The good of the
general public demanded a revised system of marketing. The rights
of the producer and the consumer exceeded those of the middleman.
Co-operatives expanded rapidly under friendly judiciary and legislative influence. 12 All those jurisdictions which had previously outlawed co-operatives now reached different conclusions in response to
the obvious advantages of the new method of marketing. Naturally, the
financial interest which was injured by the influx of co-operatives, the
11 Northern Wisconsin Co-Op. Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal, 182 Wis. 511, 197
N. W. 936 (1924), tells us that the reasons for the juristic change in policy
"sprang from a general, if not well-nigh universal, belief that the present system
of marketing is expensive and wasteful and results in an unconsdonable spread
between what is paid the producer and that charged the consumer. It was for
the purpose of encouraging efforts to bring about more direct marketing methods,
thus benefiting both producer and consumer, and thereby promoting the general
interest and the public welfare, that the legislation was enacted."
In this case the co-operative is the plaintiff in an action to prevent defendant,
Bekkedal, from interfering with the plaintiff's contracts of exclusive purchase
with the co-operative member growers. Bekkedal seeks to purchase from members. He not only denies the allegations of knowingly purchasing from contracting co-operative members, but affirmatively answers that the plaintiff's contract
in effect creates a monopoly, stifles competition, fixes prices and is an unlawful and
unreasonable restraint of trade and therefore the contract is unlawful and void.
On appeal the contract was upheld as valid because, the court felt, it was in
the interest of the public that such a contract should be made.
Wisconsin had an anti-trust statute which condemned contracts or combinations in the nature of a trust or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce. The
statute was a confirmation of the common law condemnation of monopolies. But
since the anti-trust statutes went on the books, the legislature has provided for
the incorporation of co-operative associations. This definitely demonstrates the
shift in the public policy of the state. The court said: "It may be well that the
time is approaching, if not already here, when monopolies or business combinations
controlling the market, (subject, however, to efficient government control) will
be found more desirable than unrestrained competition; but that is a question for
the lawmaking power to decide, not for the courts."
Combinations and agreements creating co-operatives have in -the past been regarded as unlawful because it was felt that their existence was, and in actual practice were, prejudicial to the public interest. But changing conditions bring on
different economic necessities and viewpoints.
There is no doubt that, as the defendant contends, the co-operative will have
a very serious effect on the defendant's business. That was the very purpose of
the legislation-to definitely and convincingly change the system of marketing.
Middlemen, like Bekkedal, are most seriously affected but the change is felt by
the legislature to aid the public generally even though it injures the special interest here represented.
12 Delaney, Farmers Co-operatives and Tax Exemption (Feb. 1, 1947) 76
America 18 traced the advance of the co-operative movement.
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middleman, was not so willing to see the status of the producer improved at his expense. The wholesalers and buyers continued their
questioning of the legality of the co-operative by court room attacks. 13
Their arguments were generally the same pattern. They contended that
co-operative contracts denied citizens equal protection under the laws as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. However, if the co-operative was operating in the interest of the public, the
courts generally followed the doctrine that the legislature had the power
to treat certain groups specially, if the character of the division warranted such treatment. The courts were of the opinion that agriculture,
as a group, was worthy of special treatment. 14
Another general objection to the co-operatives pressed by the middleman was that exclusive sale contract on which the co-operative was based
deprived the buyer of the liberty of contract. The courts answered this
objection, we have seen, by an appeal to the public interest involved.
Benefits to the public as a whole, brought by the co-operatives exceeded
the contract benefits that would accrue to the middlemen as individuals,
these courts decided.
We may safely surmise from a careful examination of the cases that
true co-operatives are definitely accepted as beneficial instruments in
distributing producer goods to the consumers as far as the courts are
concerned. 15 However, if is absolutely necessary that a co-operative ful13 Rifle Potato Grower's Co-op. Assn. v. Dexter Smith, 78 Col. 171, 240 P.
937 (1925); Ex parte Baldwin County Producers Corporation, 203 Ala. 345, 83 So.
69 (1919); Milk Producers' Marketing Co. v. Bell, 234 Ill. App. 222 (1924).
14 In Northern Wisconsin Co-op. Tobacco Pool v. Bekkedal, 182 Wis. 511,
197 N. W. 936 (1924) the court said that the legislature has the power to classify
certain agreements, condemn. some, authorize others, if there are reasonable and
proper economic, political and social reasons for making the classification.
The co-operative function is to enable co-operation among the weaker and
more scattered members of society, and this on the theory that the welfare of
society as a whole is promoted by enabling the weaker members thereof to cooperate for the purpose of improving their condiiton. There is a difference between a combination of a strong and powerful few who control a particular industry and a combination of many individually weak farmers. The former tends
toward oppression of society. Concerted action of the farmers is very difficult
and the most that can be expected is improvement of their own condition with
no apparent harmful social results.
A look at the Co-operative Act of any state will show that its fundamental
purpose is not the promotion of a monopoly. Its dominant purpose is to promote the welfare of its members.
". .. the Bingham Act, by enabling the farmers to market their crops cooperatively for the purpose, as declared in the act, of regulating distribution and
stabilizing the prices of farm products, serves a pressing public need that justifies
the classification of the farmers as a distinct class, and treats all of the class
equally and fairly, . .. It does not, therefore, offend the equal protection of the
Federal Constitution." Potter v. Dark Tobacco Growers' Co-op. Ass'n., 201 Ky.
441, 257 S. W. 33 (1923).
15 Note (1947) 22 No=n DAwm LAwyER 413 gives a discussion of the necessity of exclusive mark~eting agreements to the success of the co-operatives.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
fil the purpose for which it is organized if it6 wishes to continue as a
privileged association in the eyes of the law.
State statutes set out
clearly in their organizing acts the activities which co-operatives are to
perform. 17 If any co-operative ceases to promote, foster, and encourage the orderly maketing of goods for the benefit of the consumer,
as well as the producer, it will be treated by the courts as an unreasonable restraint of trade. The co-operative is not and can never be above
the law. The law has set out its purpose and it must fulfil that purpose or cease. to exist. This reiterates a basic tradition of our legal system-the repugnance toward unreasonable and unnecessary restraints
of trade.
Co-operatives, then, are a link in the chain of the satisfaction of
human wants. They represent a necessary conduit in the passage of
goods from producer to consumer. Courts tell us that unrestrained
competition was found wanting in developing a mutually satisfactory
system for bringing goods to the consumer.' 8 A corrupt middleman
Hanna, Law of Co-operative Marketing (1931).
"A granting of extensive power to agricultural co-operative associations and
the liberal interpretation of these authorizations do not mean that the associations are exempt from the law in respect to restraints of trade. If an association,
by arbitrary and oppressive measures tended to deprive the public of a reasonable
supply of the product of its members at a fair price, if it attempted to compel its
members to agree to unwise restrictions of production, if its selling and other policies were designed to drive competitors out of business for reasons of spite or revenge, or in general if the association acted in a high handed manner, having little
relation to its fundamental purposes, the association might be enjoined from continuing its restraints, contracts essentially connected with its unfair conduct might
be avoided and in extreme cases the association itself might be dissolved."
See: Barnes v. Dairymen's League Co-op. Ass'n., Inc. et al., 220 App. Div.
6-24, 222 N. Y. Supp. 294 (1927); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Dearing, 254 U. S.
443, 65 L. Ed. 349, 41 S. Ct. 172 (1921).
17 Indiana Statutes Annotated (Burns, 1933) Sec. 15-1601, "Declaration of
Policy. (a) In order to promote, foster and encourage the intelligent and orderly
production and marketing of agricultural products through cooperation; and to
eliminate speculation and waste; and to make the distribution of agricultural
products between producer and consumer as direct as can be efficiently done; to
stabilize the marketing of agricultural products, and to provide for the organization and incorporation of agricultural cooperative associations and societies, this
act is passed.
"(b)
It is here recognized that agriculture is characterized by individual production in contrast to the group or factory system that characterized other
forms of industrial production, and that the ordinary form of corporate organization permits industrial groups to conibine for the purpose of group production and
the ensuing group marketing and that the public has an interest in permitting
farmers to bring their industry to the high degree of efficiency and merchandising
skill evidenced in the marketing industries; and that the public interest demands
that the farmer be encouraged to attain a superior and more direct system of
marketing in the substitution of merchandising for the blind, unscientific and
speculative selling of crops." (Acts 1925, chap. 20, sec. 1 p. 42; 1931, chap. 34,
sec. 1, p. 79).
18 Supra, note 10.
16

